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NOTES
THE OVER-CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
LIBEL LAW: PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS,
INC. v. HEPPS
INTRODUCTION
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,' the Supreme Court changed
the current stattis of libel law and, in the process, increased the burden of
proof for a private figure plaintiff suing for libel when the matter is of
public concern. The Court decided that for private figure plaintiffs to succeed
in a libel suit against a media defendant, they not only have to prove fault
on the media's part, they also have to prove falsity. The Hepps decision,
designed to diminish the chilling effect of libel suits on the media,2 will
discourage many plaintiffs with legitimate claims from filing libel suits and
severely encroach upon a state's legitimate interest in protecting its citizens'
good names.
This Note will show the practical difference between the two theories of
fault and falsity. It will also discuss the effect of this decision on the
legitimate state interest in preserving the good name of its citizens and in
allowing compensation for injury to their reputations. Finally, this Note will
present arguments in favor of a new approach to libel law, acting on the
presumption that most private figure libel plaintiffs do not seek monetary
damages, but seek instead to clear their reputations in the community in
which they live and work.
I. BACKGROUND
The opportunity for free discussion is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system.' Implicit in this fundamental principle is the dissemi-
nation of social, political, and economic information to the citizenry.4 A
free press' plays a vital role in insuring the flow of ideas and information
1. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
2. Id. at 1564.
3. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S 359, 369 (1931).
4. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15 (1963);
A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF GOVERNMENT 16-17 (1948).
5. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment applies to state governments under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
The United States Supreme Court has defined the "press" broadly. The following are areas
which the Court has considered a part of the "press." See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
392 DEPAUL LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 36:391
to the public and provides a way for citizens to make informed decisions in
the democratic political process. Libel cases have been decided in light of a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials." 6
To protect this dissemination of ideas, the Court has developed the
"marketplace" concept. 7 Under this concept, certain rights have been granted
to the press, such as the right to freedom from prior restrdints.8 Freedom
of the press, however, often conflicts with other constitutional guarantees
or societal interests.9 One of these interests is a need to preserve the integrity
of an individual's reputation.
At common law, libel performed a vindicatory function by enabling the
plaintiff to brand the defamatory publication as false. 10 As the law developed,
it performed a preventive function in that it permitted a defamed person to
expose the defamatory rumor before harm to his reputation had resulted."
Libel, as a common law tort, granted the plaintiff the presumption of a
good name.' 2 The plaintiff had to prove only that a written publication that
subjected him to hatred or ridicule was false. 3 Some commentators have
suggested that at common law, falsity was not an element of libel at all, but
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (newspaper); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969) (radio); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967) (magazines);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S 532, 538-40 (1965) (television); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (noncommercial ads); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502
(1952) (motion pictures).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
7. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Justice Holmes established the
marketplace analogy in Abrams and declared that the discovery of truth was the goal best
served by the maintenance of the marketplace. But see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967). "The fact that dissemination of information and opinion on questions of
public concern is ordinarily a legitimate, protected and indeed cherished activity does not mean,
however, that one may in all respects carry on that activity exempt from sanctions designed to
safeguard the legitimate interests of others." Id. at 150.
8. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9. The sixth amendment rights to a fair trial and to confront one's accuser conflict with
the freedom of the press. The Supreme Court has recognized that the press's rights give way
to the rights of the accused. See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 215 (D.D.C.
1972) (privilege denied in favor of accused's right to fair trial).
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 569 comment b (1938).
11. Id.
12. Common law libel was premised on strict liability. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFA-
MATION § 5 (1978). Strict liability resulted from the common law presumption that the
defendant acted with malice. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS, 42-43, 187
(1980).
13. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White,
J., concurring).
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that libel was a tort related to damage of reputation.' 4 Truth was a defense,
but if a defamatory falsehood was circulated, courts presumed a general
injury to reputation. 5 Punitive damages were available if common law malice
was shown. 16 Libel law has been constitutionalized to protect first amendment
freedoms, especially the freedom of the press.
An "absolutist" view of the first amendment, which would deny all
governmental power to regulate speech, has often been suggested and re-
peatedly rejected by the Court. 7 Rather, the Court has applied various tests
which recognize some governmental power to inhibit speech in certain con-
texts. For example, the "redeeming social value" test has frequently been
used in obscenity cases.'" The "clear and present danger" test has been used
to regulate subversive activity and the publication of matter thought to
obstruct justice. 9 Finally, the Court has used a "balancing test" which was
not intended to directly condemn the content of the speech but which
incidentally limited its exercise.20
The Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2' balanced the opposing
interests of self-integrity and a free press and held that, under the first
amendment, the press will not be liable for printing factual misstatements
about public officials unless the press acted with "actual malice." 2 2 In that
14. Therefore, reputation is a protected interest even if not entirely based on truth. W.
PROSSER, THa LAW OF TORTS 797-99 (4th ed. 1971).
15. 472 U.S. at 765 (White, J., concurring). See also supra note 14. Since falsity is not an
element of common law libel, truth as a defense does not operate to counteract an element of
the tort, but instead represents justification for a defamation. It is for this reason that literal
truth need not be demonstrated. See infra note 62.
16. 472 U.S. at 765 (White, J., concurring).
17. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HAzv. L. REV. 1, 11 (1965) [hereinafter Brennan]. Meiklejohn believed that freedom
of expression in areas of public affairs is an absolute. Id. at 12. But, he found no fault with
laws which required speakers to conform to the necessities of the community (such as time and
place restrictions) as long as the restrictions were not excuses for attempts to suppress speech.
Id. at 13. Meiklejohn would have allowed distinctions, however, among libel laws by virtue of
the principle of "governing importance" that the people should be given that information
necessary for self-government. Id. at 13-14. The first amendment gives no protection to a
defendant in a private defamation case; libel has no relation to the business of governing. Id.
at 14. See also Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 259
(private libel is subject to legislative control; political or seditious libel is not).
18. Brennan, supra note 17, at 11.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Id. at 279-80. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Defenses of Fair Comment
and Conditional Privilege, 30 Mo. L. REv. 467 (1965). The author argues that New York Times
appears to extend the privilege to all matters of public concern, "a decision ... [much]
broader than the facts of the case made necessary." Id. at 475. The author's concern was that if
this interpretation were correct, false, defamatory statements could be made "concerning anyone
or anything submitted to the public for its approval without liability unless made maliciously."
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case, an elected official in Montgomery, Alabama brought suit in state court
alleging that he had been libeled by an advertisement in the New York
Times.2 3 The advertisement contained statements, some of which were false,
about police action allegedly directed against students who participated in a
civil rights demonstration. 24 Sullivan claimed the statements referred to him
because his duties included supervision of the police department. 25 The
Supreme Court held that a state cannot award damages to a public official
for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proved
"actual malice." Actual malice was defined as a statement made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was
true or false.2 6 Decisions following New York Times enlarged the constitu-
Id. at 476. Also, the three concurring judges' position in New York Times would be to ad-
vocate an absolute privilege. "Their position seems questionable if limited to the public official
and candidates for office cases, and intolerable if extended to cases involving other matters
of public concern. Id. See also Note, Privilege to Criticize Public Officials: A Constitutional
Extension, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 349 (1965) (New York Times may be seen as extending to in-
dividuals who are the subjects of legitimate public interest but these individuals would be at
a disadvantage unless they were also extended a right to reply); Note, Delimitation of State's
Power to A ward Damages in Libel Action Brought by Public Official Against Critic of Official
Conduct, 10 N.Y.L. F. 249, 256 (1964) ("[l~t may well be that the Supreme Court's decision
today is the harbinger of an absolute privilege for newspapers tomorrow."); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Defamation-Actual Malice, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
44 B.U.L. REV. 563, 571 (1964) (Court's rule may lead to excessive abuse, especially when
injured party is denied media access); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel:
The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964) (argues for right to reply statutes).
But see Note, No Recovery for Libel of Public Official in his Official Conduct in Absence
of Actual Malice, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 191, 193 (1964) ("Had this decision been otherwise,
a precedent would have been set for staggering recoveries against newspapers which would have
resulted in their refusal to publish similar criticism of public officials.").
23. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
24. Id. at 257. But see Opinion, The Development of Modern Libel Law: A Philosophic
Analysis, 16 N.M.L. REV. 183 (1986) [hereinafter Opinion].
[T]he New York Times Court created the actual malice standard in reaction to
a city government and its officials who were abridging the rights of a certain class
of people - Black. Americans. Yet, in the process of rectifying this wrong, the
Court has implicitly created an artificial class of citizens who, . . .are being denied
equal protection because of their alleged "special status" . "Separate but
equal" has no place in American Constitutionalism.
Id. at 194.
For a similar view, see Note, First and Fourteenth Amendments Require a Conditional
Privilege for One Criticizing the Official Conduct of a Public Servant, 25 U. Pir. L. REV.
752 (1964). The Court's decision in New York Times appeared correct in the face of the
underlying racial problems, but the decision does limit the states in the exercise of their broad
power to apply their own tort laws to defamation cases. Id. at 755. See also Note, Public
Official-Recovery for Libel of Public Official Requires Proof of Actual Malice, 9 VILL. L.
REV. 534, 539 (1964) (Court gave minority groups protection without specifically stating that
as one of the considerations in the decision).
25. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 258.
26. Id. at 279-80. But see Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
[Vol. 36:391
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tional privilege to include misstatements involving public figures 27 as well as
matters of public concern. 28
Prior to 1967, state and lower federal courts were split on the issue of
whether or not the New York Times rule should extend to nonpublic offi-
cials. 29 The Supreme Court resolved this issue in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts.30 In Curtis, the Saturday Evening Post published an article which
accused Butts, the athletic director at the University of Georgia, of conspiring
to "fix" a football game between Georgia and the University of Alabama
in 1962.1' Through electronic error, a third party accidentally overheard a
phone conversation between Butts and Paul Bryant, head coach at Alabama,
one week before the game. The third party allegedly heard Butts outline
Georgia's offensive and defensive plays.3 2 Butts sued for libel and received
a jury verdict in his favor. The Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 193-94 (views the New York
Times decision as one that "may prove to be the best and most important [the Court] has ever
produced in the realm of freedom of speech"). The decision has also been seen as "an occasion
for dancing in the street." Id. at 221 n. 125 (quoting Meiklejohn).
Compare Note, Criminal Liability for Criticism of Public Officials, 19 Sw. L.J. 399, 407
(1965) ("[A] rule strictly applicable only to defamation against public officials seems unwise.
A more appropriate solution would be to apply the rule when the public interest in the
dissemination of truth requires it, whether the individual is a public official or a private
citizen.") with Note, Conditional Privilege Essential to Constitutional Freedom of Expression,
31 TENN. L. REv. 504 (1964) (privilege should probably extend to other areas of public interest)
and Note, State Law Allowing Libel Suit by Public Official Without Proof of Malice Held
Unconstitutional, 42 TEx. L. REv. 1080 (1964) (standard should apply to matters of public
concern) and Note, Defaming a Public Official, 2 TULSA L.J. 79 (1965) (libelous free speech
may shock some, but the truth emerges when all may speak without governmental restrictions).
But see Note, Defamation-Constitutional Requirement of Actual Malice, 14 Am. U.L. REv.
71, 74 (1964) (Constitution should not protect reckless defamers or those who utter defamatory
statements relying on uncertain foundations).
27. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
28. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion). Id. at 44.
See Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good Faith Defamatory Error, 75
YALE L.J. 642 (1966). "[The] proper inquiry in any libel case must be directed toward whether
the alleged libel concerned a matter legitimately within the public's concern, not on whether
the plaintiff is a public official." Id. at 651.
29. 388 U.S. at 134 n.1.
The resolution of the uncertainty in this area of libel actions requires, at bottom,
some further exploration and clarification of the relationship between libel law and
the freedom of speech and press, lest the New York Times rule become a talisman
which gives the press constitutionally adequate protection only in a limited field,
or, what would be equally unfortunate, one which goes to immunize the press from
having to make just reparations for the infliction of needless injury upon honor
and reputation through false publication.
Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
30. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
31. Id. at 135.
32. Id. at 136.
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created a new class of libel plaintiff, the public figure.33 The Court defined
a public figure as one who occupies a position of persuasive power or
importance, or who has voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront of a
particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved.34 The Court held that a public figure who is not a public official
may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood which substantially dam-
aged his reputation on a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct consti-
tuting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." 35 The degree of fault
necessary to recover damages was not actual malice but gross negligence.36
The Court reasoned that the Butts story was not "hot news" and should
have been investigated thoroughly and found that the story was published
without substantial independent support."
In 1971, the Court decided the case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc."
In a plurality opinion, the Court held that where a private figure plaintiff
sued for libel in a matter of public interest, the New York Times standard
of actual malice applied.39 In Rosenbloom, a radio station broadcast news
of Rosenbloom's arrest for possession of obscene literature and the police
seizure of obscene books from Rosenbloom's store. The station also broad-
cast stories concerning Rosenbloom's lawsuit alleging that the magazines he
distributed were not obscene. The stories of the pending lawsuit did not use
his name, but used the terms "smut literature racket" and "girlie book
peddlers.14 0 After Rosenbloom was acquitted of criminal obscenity charges,
he filed a libel action and won a jury award of $25,000 in general damages
and $725,000 in punitive damages .4 The couri of appeals reversed, 42 holding
33. Id. at 155.
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
35. 388 US. at 155.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 157. In New York Times, public officials were permitted to recover only where
the publication was deliberately falsified or published recklessly, despite the publisher's aware-
ness of probable falsity. Investigatory failures alone were held insufficient to satisfy this
standard. 376 U.S. at 286-88, 292.
38. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
39. Id. at 40-57. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black stated that the first amendment
protects the media from libel judgments even where statements are made with knowledge that
they are false. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring). Justice White reasoned that since there was no
actual malice, the first amendment gave the media the privilege to report on official actions of
public servants (the police) in full detail, without sparing the reputation of an individual involved
in or affected by any official action. Id. at 59-62 (White, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's
dissent emphasized that the legitimate function of libel law to compensate individuals for actual
harm did not conflict with the values of the first amendment. Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justices Marshall and Stewart wanted to restrict the award of damages to actually proved
injuries, id. at 84, which would make it unnecessary to rely on "elusive concepts of the degree
of fault." Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting),
40. Id. at 36.
41, Punitive damages were reduced on remittitur to $250,000. Id. at 40.
42. 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).
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that the New York Times standard applied and the fact that Rosenbloom
was not a public figure was not decisive. The Supreme Court affirmed in a
plurality opinion which was virtually impossible to use as precedent. The
eight justices who participated in the decision announced their views in five
separate opinions, "none of which commanded more than three votes." '4 3
Three approaches were discussed in Rosenbloom. One was to extend the
New York Times test to all libel cases. The second was to vary the level of
the constitutional privilege based on the status of the defamed person. The
third approach would grant the press absolute immunity from liability for
defamation.-
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,45 private figure plaintiffs were accorded
a different standard than public officials/figures or matters of public con-
cern. In Gertz, Nuccio, a Chicago policeman, was convicted of murder. The
victim's family retained Gertz to represent them in civil litigation against
Nuccio.4 6 Gertz never discussed Nuccio with the press nor played any part
in the criminal proceeding.4 7 A magazine published by Robert Welch, Inc.,
printed an article alleging that the testimony against Nuccio at his criminal
trial was false and that his prosecution was part of a Communist campaign
against the police. 48 The article portrayed Gertz as the architect of Nuccio's
"frame-up" and labeled him a "Communist fronter" who had been an
officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described in the article as a Com-
munist organization. 49
Gertz filed a libel suit in federal court. Welch asserted that Gertz was a
public figure, therefore the New York Times rule applied, which would have
allowed Welch to escape liability unless Gertz proved actual malice.5 0 The
district court ruled that Gertz was not a public figure,' and because some
statements in the article constituted libel per se, the court submitted the case
to the jury with instructions to ascertain only damages. 2 The jury awarded
Gertz $50,000. The court then entered a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict of Welch, accepting its contention that privilege protected the discus-
sion of any public issue without regard to the status of the person defamed.53
The Court of Appeals affirmed, assuming the claim of privilege by the sub-
ject matter of the article was dispositive.1 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that as long as states do not impose liability without fault, they
43. 418 U.S. 323, 333 (1974).
44. Id.
45. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
46. Id. at 325.
47. Id. at 326.
48. Id. at 325-26.
49. Id. at 326.
50. Id. at 327-28.
51. Id. at 328.
52. Id. at 328-29.
53. Id.
54. 471 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972).
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may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher
of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." The standard
became whether or not the plaintiff was a private individual, not whether
or not the speech was of public concern. The Court also held that the private
figure plaintiff could only be compensated for actual injury under these state
standards, and that punitive damages still required a showing of actual
malice. 16
Thus, the Court adopted a standard which went directly against the
Rosenbloom decision. Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence in Gertz, stated
that he joined in the decision for two reasons. First, he reasoned that by
removing punitive damages in the absence of actual malice, the Court
eliminated the fear of media self-censorship.5 7 Second, Justice Blackmun felt
it important that the Court have a clearly defined majority position that
eliminated the uncertainty inherent in the Rosenbloom plurality opinion.5
Private figure plaintiffs, therefore, no longer had to prove the press acted
with "actual malice" to receive damages for libel. In light of the legitimate
state interest in compensating individuals for harm inflicted on them by
defamatory falsehood,19 and in light of the fact that private figures have
limited access to the media to counteract false statements, 60 the Court held
that the first amendment allowed the states to impose liability on the media
"on a less demanding showing than that required by New York Times." '6'
Until recently, the Court had not dictated a particular burden of proof
required for private figure plaintiffs to succeed, and consequently, the stand-
ard varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.6 2 Some jurisdictions extended
55. 418 U.S. at 349. The state interest in compensating injury to the reputations of private
individuals requires a different rule because there is a lack of "self-help" or access to the
media, id. at 344, and private individuals, unlike public officials or figures, do not voluntarily
"thrust themselves into the forefront of particular public controversies." Id. at 345. The state
has a legitimate interest in compensating individuals harmed by defamatory falsehoods and
"[w]e would not lightly require the State to abandon this purpose .... Id. at 341.
56. Id. at 349.
57. Id. at 354. There may be no such thing as a false idea under the first amendment, id.
at 339, but "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Id. at 340. Self-
censorship is'not the only societal value at issue. "[Albsolute protection for the ... media
requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation." Id. at 341.
See also Opinion, supra note 24, at 195. ("Opinion, where stated as opinion, is and should be
protected to the utmost. False statements of fact, recklessly written, which ruin the reputation
of another, cannot and must not be protected by the first amendment.").
58. 418 U.S. at 354. "A definitive ruling ... is paramount." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 341.
60. Id. at 344-45.
61. Id. at 348.
62. Only one state other than Pennsylvania has a statute placing the burden of proving
truth on the defendant in a libel action. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 45 (West 1981). Generally,
all states allow the introduction of truth as a defense by the defendant or in mitigation of
damages. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-183 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-651 (1955); ARK. STAT.
[Vol. 36:391
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the burden of proving actual malice to all defamation plaintiffs if the
ANN. § 41-3456 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-105(2) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
3919 (1974); FLA. STAT. § 770.02 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-708 (Harrison 1984); IDAHO
CODE § 18-4803 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 126, 3 (1967); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-5-2 (Burns
1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004(2) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.045 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45.1454 (West 1982); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278,
§ 8 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765-3(1) (West 1964); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 95-1-5(2),
97-3-57 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 509.090 (Vernon 1949); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212(3)(a)
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-840 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.510(3) (1985); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 515:6 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West 1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9
(1978); N.Y. CIrv. RIGHTS LAW § 78 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-168 (1983); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.02 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 774 (West 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.175 (1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8342 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-6-9 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-770 (Law. Co-op 1976); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-404 (1982); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.005 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CrV.
P. R. 9(j)(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6560 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-417 (1950, replace-
ment volume 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.58.020 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (1966);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.01(3) (West 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 7-6-217 (1977). Substantial truth is
usually sufficient to absolve the defendant of liability. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-168 (1983)
(if defense of truth undertaken, defendant must prove truth of entire charge). Once the defen-
dant asserts the truth of the publication, the burden of proof is generally on him to prove
the truth. This does not differ from the Pennsylvania statute which placed the burden of proof
of truth on the defendant once the issue was properly raised. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8343 (Purdon 1982) (emphasis added).
States which do not have specific libel statutes often provide for truth as a defense in their
constitutions. See also Note, Statute Requiring Defendant to Carry Burden of Proving Truth
of Defamatory Statements Does Not Violate First Amendment of United States Constitution,
58 TEMP. L.Q. 409 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Proving Truth]. As of 1985, the highest courts
in seven states ruled that the plaintiff must carry the burden of proving falsity to recover for
libel (Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 316, 560 P.2d 1216, 1223 (1977)
(en banc); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 112 n.6, 448 A.2d
1317, 1322 n.6 (1982); Troman v. Wood, 62 Il1. 2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1975);
Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453, 457 (Miss. 1967); Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Co. v. Allen,
99 Nev. 404, 412-13, 664 P.2d 337, 343 (1983); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.,
42 N.Y.2d 369, 378-92, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1305-06, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 949-51, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 969 (1977); Mark v. The Seattle Times, 96 Wash. 2d 473, 486, 635 P.2d 1081, 1088
(1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982)). Id. at 418 n.73. Some intermediate appellate courts
reached the same holding (Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 133, 162 Cal. Rptr.
701, 705 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1982); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ane,
423 So. 2d 376, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 458 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
1984) (per curiam); McHale v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 566 (La. Ct. App.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 605-06,
417 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 (1981); Brown v. Boney, 41 N.C. App. 636, 648, 255 S.E.2d 784, 791
(1979), cert. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E.2d 910 (1979); Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp.,
83 A.D.2d 294, 297, 445 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (1981)). Id. at 418 n.74. Four state supreme courts
and several intermediate appellate courts have, since Gertz, said allocating the burden to the
defendant is appropriate (Elliott v. Roach, 409 N.E.2d 661, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); McCall
v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
975 (1982); Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 146-47, 377 A.2d 807,
814-15 (Law Div. 1977), modified and remanded on other grounds, 164 N.J. Super. 465, 397
A.2d 334 (App. Div. 1979); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 94 (Okla. 1976);
Memphis Pub. Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn. 1978); Frank B. Hall & Co.
v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 623-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636,
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defamatory publication related to a matter of public concern. 6'
II. THE HEPps DECISION
Maurice S. Hepps is the principal stockholder of a corporation that
franchises a chain of "Thrifty" stores, which sells beer, soft drinks, and
snacks. The Philadelphia Inquirer published a series of five articles between
May 1975 and May 1976 indicating that Hepps had links to organized crime
and used some of those links to influence both the state's legislative and
administrative governmental processes."4
Hepps brought suit for defamation in a Pennsylvania state court. Penn-
sylvania law required a private figure who brings a defamation suit to bear
the burden of proving negligence or malice by the defendant in publishing
the statements. 65 As to falsity, Pennsylvania followed the common law
presumption of an individual's good reputation. Defamatory statements
were, therefore, presumptively false, although a publisher who successfully
bore the burden of proving the truth of the statements had an absolute
defense.66 The trial court concluded that Pennsylvania's statute, allocating
the burden of proving the truth of the statements to the defendant, violated
the federal Constitution, and instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the
burden of proving falsity.67
Hepps appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. That court
applied the Gertz standard and concluded that a showing of fault did not
require a showing of falsity. It held that placing the burden of showing truth
on the defendant did not unconstitutionally inhibit free debate, and remanded
the case for a new trial. 68 The court viewed Gertz as simply requiring plaintiffs
654, 318 N.W.2d 141, 150, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982)). Id. at 418-19 n.75. See also
Note, Private Lives and Public Concerns: The Decade Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 51
BROOKLYN L. REV. 425 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Private Lives] (most state courts adopted a
negligence standard, based on a reasonable person or professional practices standard of care,
for private figure plaintiffs).
63. "This approach sacrifices the considerable common-law protection of private reputa-
tional interests in favor of providing broad protection to the media. Because the public interest
test is not required by the federal Constitution, its adoption should be based upon the common-
law policies of the individual states." Note, Private Lives, supra note 62, at 477-78. As of
December 1984, and counting the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands, thirty states placed the burden of falsity on the plaintiff, fourteen on the defendant,
six had divided authority on the issue, and Montana initially placed the burden on the plaintiff
but allowed it to shift. Kaufman, Libel 1980-1985: Promises and Realities, 90 DICK. L. REv.
545, 554 n.48 (1986).
64. 106 S. Ct. at 1560.
65. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8344 (Purdon 1982).
66. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8343(b)(1) (Purdon 1982) (defendant has burden of prov-
ing truth of a defamatory statement).
67. 106 S. Ct. at 1560.
68. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 329, 485 A.2d 374, 382-87 (1984),
rev'd, 472 U.S. 749 (1986). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in holding that Gertz did not
compel a libel plaintiff to prove falsity in order to comply with first amendment standards,
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to show fault in actions for defamation. 69 The court also noted that the
presumption of falsity and the burden of proof allocation were justified
because media defendants have unique means of determining the facts on
which their statements are based.70 The court reasoned that absent a pre-
sumption of falsity, the plaintiff would be forced to prove the statement's
falsity, and proving a negative is "a particularly burdensome task when the
alleged libel is a general accusation." ' 71
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that when the speech
is of public concern, a private figure suing for libel must bear the burden
of proving the falsity of the speech as well as the defendant's fault. 72 The
private figure is not relieved of this burden merely because the state has a
media "shield" law73 which allows media employees to refuse to divulge
their sources, thus making the plaintiff's burden heavier. 74 The Court struck
down the Pennsylvania statute requiring that libel defendants prove the truth
of defamatory statements. 75
joined a minority of jurisdictions that have upheld the burden of proof allocation. See Note,
Proving Truth, supra note 62, at 409.
69. Id. at 318, 485 A.2d at 383-84. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48. The Supreme Court
stated in Gertz:
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher...
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. This approach . . .rec-
ognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individ-
uals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press .. from the rigors of
strict liability for defamation.
Id.
70. See Note, Proving Truth, supra note 62, at 411.
71. Id. See also Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co., 441 Pa. 432, 450-51, 273 A.2d 899, 908-09
(1971) (preferable to place burden of proof on party having affirmative allegation).
72. 106 S. Ct. at 1559.
73. 42 PA. CONST. STAT § 5942(a) (1982). Other states also have media shield laws. See
ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12
2237 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1974); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-901 (1967)
(amended 1985) (court may divest media of its protection in light of compelling public
interest); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 1452 (West 1982) (conditional privilege from
compulsory disclosure of source); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1984); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023-.025 (West 1983)
(amended 1983) (shield exists except in libel cases where needed to show actual malice); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 20-146 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275
(1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (1976) (amended 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7
(1978); N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (McKinney 1976) (amended 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-01-06.2 (1976) (disclosure not required except upon court order); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2739.12 (Anderson 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-11-1 (1985 revision); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 1.16 (Vernon 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1974). Some states
provide for media shields except in defamation actions wherein the defendant asserts a defense
based on the content or source of such information. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506B
(West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.530(3) (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(b)(1) (1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980). States which do not have media shield laws provide for media
protection under their constitution.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 1565.
75. Id.
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The majority opinion76 reasoned that the burden of showing fault neces-
sarily involves showing falsity," because a jury would be more likely to
accept a plaintiff's contention that the defendant was at fault in publishing
the statements if convinced that the relevant statements were false.78 The
Court concluded that, as a practical matter, the evidence offered by the
plaintiff on the publisher's fault in not adequately investigating the truth of
the published statement necessarily encompassed evidence of the asserted
falsity of the statements.7 9
The Court analogized the need for free debate on public issues in the
governmental restriction and seditious libel cases ° with the facts in Hepps.8'
The Court argued that "placement by state law of the burden of proving
truth upon media defendants who publish speech of public concern deters
such speech because of the fear that liability will unjustifiably result," 2 and
would have a "chilling" effect on the media.83
Justice Stevens, in his dissent,8 4 argued that by attaching no weight to the
state's legitimate interest in protecting the private individual's good name,
the Court reached a "pernicious result." '85 The dissent concluded that while
deliberate, or even inadvertent, libels often destroy private personages, they
contribute little to the "marketplace of ideas" which the majority sought to
protect in this decision.8 6 Justice Stevens stated that first amendment rights
are adequately protected by requiring the plaintiff to show fault, or actual
malice, or even negligence, therefore, there is no reason to burden the
plaintiff with proving falsity.8 7
The dissent also made the distinction between proving fault and proving
76. The majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Id. at 1559.
77. Id. at 1565.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The government cannot limit speech protected by the first amendment without bearing
the burden of showing that the restriction is justifiable. Id. at 1564. See, e.g., Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (content based
restriction); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (speaker based
restriction). Here, however, the publicity is not directed at governmental employees or agencies,
therefore it cannot be analogized to seditious libel prosecutions. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
81. 106. S. Ct. at 1564.
82. Id.
83. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, adopted
the majority view and was willing to extend the holding to nonmedia defendants. Id. at 1566.
See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (freedom of discussion "must embrace
all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period").
84. The dissent was filed by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White and Rehnquist. 106 S. Ct. at 1566.
85. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1567 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1567-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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falsity,a" and concluded that where private figure plaintiffs are concerned,
the first amendment does not require tipping the scales in favor of protecting
true speech merely because the speech is of public concern. 9
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM ,
In establishing this new burden of proving falsity for the private figure
libel plaintiff when suing on a matter of public concern, the Court has
confused the two theories of fault and falsity. Fault 9° and falsity9 are two
distinct theories, and while some demonstrations of proof of fault involve
proof of falsity, many do not. Plaintiffs have traditionally had the burden
of proving falsity in invasion of privacy cases. 92 In libel cases, truth has
been generally retained as an affirmative defense for the media defendant. 9
This defense never arose unless the plaintiff established the defendant's fault
in publishing the statements.
In the past, if the plaintiff failed to establish that the publisher was at
fault, 94 defined as actual malice9" or negligence, 91 the defendant did not have
88. Id. at 1568-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1571 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Goldberg, The Bar and the Press, 53
ILL. B.J. 716 (1965) (on the balance between freedom of the press and privacy); Note, Con-
stitutional Law-Freedom of Press-Misstatement of Fact Held Privileged in Libel Action by
Public Official, 14 DEPAUL L. Rav. 181, 186 (1964) ("The press must be kept by definite
law, regulation or judicial decisions within the confines of decency, honesty and justice. This
can only be accomplished by balancing various overlapping rights. Should one right categorically
outweigh another, both could eventually be lost."). A review of the Court's own statements
concerning the fundamental right of the individual to protect his reputation shows that first
amendment interests do not automatically outweigh the individual's interest in his own reputa-
tion. Surkin, The Status of the Private Figure's Right to Protect His Reputation Under the
United States Constitution, 90 DICK. L. REV. 667, 680 (1986) [hereinafter Surkin] (Mr. Surkin
was trial counsel for the plaintiffs in Hepps and counsel of record in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court and United States Supreme Court litigation.).
90. Fault is defined as: "Negligence; an error or defect of judgment or of conduct; any
deviation from prudence, duty or rectitude; any shortcoming or neglect of care or performance
resulting from inattention, incapacity, or perversity; a wrong tendency, course or act; bad faith
or mismanagement; neglect of duty." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 548 (5th ed. 1979). See also
Comment, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247 (1985) (some
standards for proving fault in libel cases are: inherent improbability, awareness of inconsistent
information, no source, unreliable source, failure to contact an obvious source).
91. Falsity is defined as: "[The] term implies more than erroneous or untrue; it indicates
knowledge of untruth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (5th ed. 1979). But see Note, Hepps v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., The Validity of the Common Law Presumption of Falsity in
Light of New York Times and its Progeny, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 125 (1985) (written about
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision - as a practical matter, proving fault also requires
plaintiff to prove falsity).
92. See Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right of Privacy, 57 A.L.R.3d 16 (1974) and cases
cited therein.
93. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
94. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
95. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80.
96. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 135.
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to present a defense. If the plaintiff did establish fault, the media defendant
could use the defense of truth to escape liability. If the defendant could not
establish truth after the plaintiff established fault, the defendant was held
liable for defamation.
Under the Hepps decision, if the plaintiff fails to prove falsity and fault
as a part of its case in chief, the defendant may move for a directed verdict.
Thus, the issue of truth or falsity of the publication is removed from the
trier of fact. Traditionally, the trier of fact has been allowed to hear both
sides of the issue and then decide the merits of the case based on the
credibility of the witnesses. The Hepps decision makes the libel trial rest
solely on constitutional issues, and removes the actual merits of the case
from deliberation.9 7 This result is extremely detrimental to private figure
plaintiffs whose primary purpose in suing for libel is to receive a judicial
decree which clears their reputations.
Proof of fault does not necessarily depend on, or encompass, proof of
falsity as the majority in Hepps concludes. 9 The media defendant may have
been at fault in negligently gathering its information, in basing its accusations
on unreliable sources, in not confirming its information with independent
sources, in relying on outdated information stored in the defendant's files,
or in not being a responsible member of the media community. 9 By insisting
97. The Curtis Court stated:
IN]either the interests of the publisher nor those of society necessarily preclude
a damage award based on improper conduct which creates a false publication. It
is the conduct element, therefore, on which we must primarily focus if we are
successfully to resolve the antithesis between civil libel actions and the freedom of
speech and press. Impositions based on misconduct can be neutral with respect to
the content of the speech involved .... and can be adjusted to strike a fair balance
between the interests of the community in free circulation of information and those
of individuals in seeking recompense for harm done by the defamatory falsehood.
Id. at 153.
98. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1565.
99. But see Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749. If the press is faced with punitive damages
for any mistaken publication which injures someone's reputation, the result would be unac-
ceptable self-censorship. Id. at 770 (White, J., concurring). Justice White further stated however:
[I]f protecting the press from intimidating damages liability that might lead to
excessive timidity was the driving force behind New York Times and Gertz, it is
evident that the Court engaged in severe overkill in both cases .... In New York
Times, instead of escalating the plaintiff's burden of proof to an almost impossible
level, we could have achieved our stated goal by limiting the recoverable damages
to a level that would not unduly threaten the press .... Presumed damages to
reputation might have been prohibited, or limited, as in Gertz. Had that course
been taken and the common law standard of liability been retained, the defamed
public official, upon proving falsity, could at least have had a judgment to that
effect. His reputation would then be vindicated .... At the very least, the public
official should not have been required to satisfy the actual malice standard where
he sought no damages but only to clear his name.
Id. at 771 (White, J., concurring). See also Note, The Evolution of a Public Issue: New York
Times Through Greenmoss, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 773, 790-91 (1986) (suggestion that New
York Times should be overturned is not surprising but it would be a constitutional tragedy);
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on proof of falsity in addition to proof of fault, the Hepps Court effectively
sanctioned these unprofessional news and information gathering devices.
The Court argued that the "First Amendment's protection of true speech
on matters of public concern" justified the imposition of a rule of law which
will protect all true speech from exclusion from the public domain, because
any other rule would have a chilling effect on the media.'00 The Court then
admitted that the allocation of the burden of proof of falsity to the plaintiff
may or may not affect how much of the speech is true.10' As the dissent
points out, the Court then concluded that a rule burdening the dissemination
of such speech'02 would "contravene the First Amendment."'0 3 Accordingly,
the majority imposed the burden of proof of falsity on the private figure
plaintiff before allowing the recovery of damages from a media defendant.'04
Thus, a plaintiff who could prove the highest form of fault, actual malice,
would still be precluded from recovering any damages unless he could also
prove falsity. 05
The Court's decision in Hepps is internally consistent because, as the
dissent points out, the Court "grossly undervalues" the state interest in
redressing injuries to private reputations.' °0 The Court's major premise is
that when there is doubt regarding the truthfulness of a defamatory state-
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984) ("False statements of fact harm both
the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. [A state] may rightly employ its
libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens.") (emphasis in original). But see McNulty,
The Gertz Fault Standard and the Common Law of Defamation: An Argument for Predictability
of Result and Certainty of Expectation, 35 DRxE L. REV. 51, 100 (1985) (The author wanted
to see an extension of Gertz to matters of public concern; he proposed that fault [awareness
of the falsity] and actual damages [proof of actual injury] be the criteria for all libel cases.
This would eliminate the shifting burdens of proof and the need to find definitions for actual
malice and public concern which the courts and juries could work with.).
100. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1564. See also Curtis, 388 U.S. 130. "Truth as an absolute defense
and media privileges are designed to foster free communication." 388 U.S. at 151-52. The
Curtis Court also felt that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press are adequately
served by judicial control over excessive jury verdicts. Id. at 160. Compare Pedrick, Freedom
of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. REv. 581,
592 (1964) (the new privilege should be extended to all matters of public concern) with Note,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan-The Scope of a Privilege, 51 VA. L. Rav. 106, 119 (1965)
(irresponsible press with broad privileges not likely to produce informed public opinion-
criticizing the government is to be encouraged, but "granting a further privilege to those who
misstate the facts in defaming outspoken private citizens will only restrain that free debate
-which is desired"). See also Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 243, 28 N.E.
1, 4 (1891) ("[Wjhat the interest of private citizens in public matters requires is freedom of
discussion rather than of statement") (Mr. Justice Holmes).
101. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1564.
102. Unverifiable gossip, some of which is true. Id.
103. Id. at 1569.
104. Id. at 1564.
105. Id. at 1568 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106, Id. at 1569 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ment, the balance must tip toward protection of the statement and against
vindication of the private individual's reputation.'07
The Court's decision does help to unify the law in the area, which was
split in the state courts that have considered this issue since Gertz. Some
courts have held that the defendant must bear the burden of showing truth; 0 8
others have held that the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing falsity.' °
In providing for a uniform law, however, the Court has limited states in the
exercise of their broad powers to apply their own tort law to certain
defamation cases.
Private figure libel cases serve important state interests."10 "The Consti-
tution has not stripped private citizens of all means of redress for injuries
inflicted upon them by careless liars.""' Careless and unchecked lies, whether
printed or not, do nothing to enhance the free marketplace of ideas, and
libel suits are the only hope for vindication that the law gives to a citizen
whose self-integrity has been attacked."'
In Hepps, the Court overruled the Pennsylvania statute which allocated
the burden of proving the truth of a defamatory statement to the defendant." 3
In so doing, the Court has removed from the states the power to define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher of a defam-
atory falsehood injurious to a private individual. The right to protect one's
reputation should not be undervalued because it is not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution." 4
Instead of combining the issues of fault and falsity, the Court could have
made falsity an alternative to fault for the plaintiff." 5 The stakes are high
107. Id. at 1563-65. But see Gertz, 418 U.S at 343-48. The state's interest in redressing
injuries to private reputations requires a less stringent burden. Id. "Private individuals are. ..
more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater."
Id. at 344. See also Bezanson, Plato's Cave Revisited: The Epistemology of Perception in
Contemporary Defamation Law, 90 DICK. L. REV. 585, 606 (1986) (in libel law, a "clear eye"
should be kept on the reputational foundation of the tort).
108. See 106 S. Ct. at 1561. See also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
110. "The protection of private personality .. . is left primarily to the individual states
under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 93. "Surely, if the 1950's taught us anything, they taught us that the poisonous
atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society." Id. at 94.
113. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
114. See Surkin, supra note 89, at 669.
All parties to the current debate over the future structure of libel law should
recognize that the rights of free speech and press, and the right of the private
individual to protect his reputation are not adversarial but instead symbiotic. We
should direct our efforts toward maximizing both rights rather than favoring one
over the other.
Id.
115. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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when an individual's reputation is at issue, 16 and the law should allow that
individual to prove his case in as many ways as possible, rather than
combining two already difficult burdens into one onerous burden.
In the Hepps decision, the majority's comparison to the government libel
cases is misplaced. 1 7 When the government places restrictions on the media
to prevent discussion or dissemination of information regarding governmental
acts or policies, the government has acted in direct opposition to the fun-
damental purpose of the first amendment. When a private individual's
reputation is at stake, however, especially when the individual is not a public
figure and has done nothing to place himself in the public eye, there should
be less first amendment freedom guaranteed to the press. Each of the justices
in the Hepps decision has either written or joined in opinions expressly
stating that the right of a private individual to protect his reputation has
equal constitutional standing with the right to freedom of the press.',
Access to information is a valid public interest. However, the Court's
ruling in Hepps does little to further this interest. If the reason for access
to this information is to provide the citizenry with the information necessary
to make informed decisions about society and the government, false infor-
mation arguably has little to offer this decision making process." 9
IV. IMPACT
The Court made its decision to protect the free flow of ideas and infor-
mation to the public so that the public may make informed decisions. That
the rationale behind the ruling is justifiable, in fact, basic to our ordered
system, is not the issue. For our society to function, there must be free
access to information which the press is capable of disseminating.' 20 This
access, however, should not be interpreted to mean that the press is free to
print lies about an individual or to engage in sloppy investigative techniques,
and justify such publications under the guise of the first amendment.' 2'
116. 383 U.S. at 94.
117. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
118. See Surkin, supra note 89, at 673-77 nn,31-40. "The review of historical antecedents
and the Supreme Court's own statements concerning the fundamental nature of the right of
the private individual to protect his reputation makes apparent the error of the contention that
first amendment interests, ipso facto, outweigh the individual's interest in his own reputation."
Id. at 680.
119. See supra notes 3-8, 84-89 and accompanying text. "The core purpose of the first
amendment relates to self-governance and the New York Times privilege should too." Bran-
son, The Public Figure-Private Person Dichotomy: A Flight from First Amendment Reality,
90 DICK. L. REV. 627, 637 (1986) (The author's proposed solution is to apply the first amend-
ment only when necessary and return all remaining cases to the common law approach.).
120. "It is not simply the possibility of a judgment for damages that results in self-censorship.
The very possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and protracted process, is
threat enough to cause discussion and debate .. . [to steer away] from public cognizance."
403 U.S. at 53.
121. See Dun & Bradstreet: "[Pit makes little sense to give the most protection to those
publishers who reach the most readers and therefore pollute the channels of communication
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In shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff to show the falsity of the
speech, Hepps allows the media to print whatever it wishes, with little or no
fear that its statements will be challenged. This decision will probably result
in fewer libel suits brought by private figure plaintiffs. 22
The Court considered the idea that individuals with legitimate complaints
may refrain from using the courts to redress the wrongs against their
reputations.'23 The Court engaged in a circular argument that some falsehood
must be protected to provide the public with information which it needs,
and to diminish the chilling effect of libel cases on the media. 2 4 Yet, to
date, the empirical evidence does not show that libel cases weigh heavily on
the media. In fact, a recent study shows that of 700 libel cases examined
between 1974 and 1984, the media won 90% of the time. 25 It does not
appear that the media has been adversely affected by libel suits. If anything,
libel suits may tend to promote more careful investigation by the media of
its stories, which will ultimately benefit society as a whole.' 26 The argument
that the common law presumption of falsity will lead to faultless liability in
the close cases in which juries can not decide on the truth of the publication 27
with the most misinformation and do the most damage to private reputation." 472 U.S. at
773. See also Whitten v. Commercial Dispatch Pub. Co., Inc., 487 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1986).
"While a newspaper is granted some leeway in its reporting, it may not misstate the facts or
otherwise misconstrue the truth." Id. at 846.
122. See supra note 120. The same analysis should also apply to libel plaintiffs.
123. 106 S. Ct. at 1563-64.
124, Id.
125. See Soloski, The Study and the Libel Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?, 71 IOWA L. REV.
215 (1985) [hereinafter Soloski]. Professor Soloski researched 700 libel cases from 1974 to mid-
1984. His study shows that seven out of ten libel cases involved media defendants. Over one-
half of these cases are the result of stories that deal with the plaintiff's business or professional
activities. Forty percent of the cases brought against the media are by private individuals. The
media wins 90% of all cases pressed to judicial resolution. Id. at 218. A study by the Libel
Defense Center conducted from 1981-1984 found that while news organizations eventually prevail
in over 90% of the cases, they lost 8307o of the initial jury trials. Of Reputations and Reporters,
TIME, Mar. 19, 1984, at 64.
126. 106 S. Ct. at 1571 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Soloski, supra note 125. Daily
newspapers are the media most sued for libel, representing over two-thirds of the reported
cases. Most libel suits do not result from "hard-hitting, investigative news stories that are run
on front pages under banner 'headlines." Soloski, supra note 125, at 219. These front-page
stories represent only 45% of libel suits and tend to be brought by elected and nonelected
public officials or professionals. Business owners, managers, or white collar employees bring
libel suits concerning stories on the inside pages. Id. As one newspaper editor said, "Investigative
stories are done with great care .... It's the routine [inside page] stories that rise up and
bite you in the ass." Id. (emphasis added). This suggests sloppy or incomplete investigative
techniques are used in the stories which affect most private figure libel plaintiffs. When the
aggrieved party is a private individual, the allegedly libelous story tends to focus on his criminal
or public acts and the study further found that the lower an individual's community visibility,
the greater the likelihood that the story dealt with his business or professional acts. Id. "The
press does not live up to its great first amendment mandate with reportage that is shallow
or sloppy." Smolla, "Where Have You Gone, Walter Cronkite?" The First Amendment and
the End of Innocence, 39 ARx. L. REv. 311, 333 (1985).
127. Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,
454 U.S. 962, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130 (1981).
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leads to a possible solution: each state may pass statutes which provide that
in libel cases, excessive damages will not be allowed.
Sloppy journalism never produces the truth, yet the courts continue to
bar libel cases on constitutional grounds because libel plaintiffs fail to meet
their initial burdens. After the Hepps decision, the Court denied certiorari
in the case of Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable.128 The Chief
Justice, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the denial of certiorari
and called for a re-examination of the New York Times standard.
In Coughlin, the cable company conducted an investigation into the alleged
failure of the Philadelphia police to enforce state liquor laws against an
"after hours" bar. 29 The company hid a camera across from the bar, filmed
Coughlin entering and leaving, and then broadcast the tape. The announcer
on the tape stated that "the only paperwork we saw [Coughlin] doing was
carrying this envelope out of the club less than a minute after he walked
in." 30 The broadcast implied that Coughlin had accepted a bribe.
The company made no attempt to obtain Coughlin's version of the story.
Four months after the evening in question 3' and prior to the broadcast, a
reporter for the company approached Coughlin and, with the cameras filming
the event, thrust a microphone into Coughlin's face and asked him what he
had been doing four months earlier.1 2 Coughlin refused to answer.
Coughlin filed a libel suit'33 alleging that even a "minimal investigation"
of the facts would have revealed that he was ordered to investigate a
vandalism complaint at the bar and, having done so, returned to his patrol
car to fill out the incident report. The "envelope," Coughlin alleged, was
his incident report book. 3 4
The district court concluded that Coughlin had raised a genuine issue of
material fact concerning the truth of the allegedly defamatory statement
since the broadcast was certainly capable of defamatory interpretation. The
court nevertheless granted the company's motion for summary judgment
because Coughlin had not introduced sufficient evidence of "actual malice"
to withstand such motion. 35
The court of appeals affirmed. One judge, while concurring in the affir-
mation, observed that "the New York Times standard makes it hard enough
for a public figure to win a libel suit, even when faced, as here, with what
any fair observer must agree is egregious conduct on the part of the media.' '1 36
128. 106 S. Ct. 2927 (1986).
129. Id.
130. Id. (emphasis in original).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2927-28.
133. 603 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
134. 106 S. Ct. at 2928.
135. Id. Coughlin had to satisfy the "actual malice" New York Times standard because he
was a public official acting in his official capacity at the time the statement was made.
136. Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, 780 F.2d 340, 349 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Becker, J., concurring).
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Coughlin appealed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Chief Justice
Burger, not pleased with the denial, pointed out that Coughlin had been
accused of accepting a bribe "on the basis of a cursory investigation, yet
his libel suit to clear his name ha[d] been found to be constitutionally
barred."' 37 Coughlin could not publicly clear his name in a court of law
because he failed to prove fault on the company's part, even though falsity
was deemed to be a material issue. The actual merits of the case, the truth
or falsity of the statement, will never be heard by a jury unless Coughlin
discovers new evidence. Meanwhile, Coughlin may be subject to disciplinary
action or even termination by the police department because his case could
not be heard.
Coughlin, however, at least has the opportunity to clear his name with
his superiors and coworkers once the internal investigation is complete.
Unlike Coughlin, the private figure plaintiff has no other way to clear his
name and reputation in the community in which he lives and works. Like
Coughlin, however, the private figure plaintiff will be denied the opportunity
to clear his name in court if he cannot supply enough evidence to satisfy
his burden as to the publisher's fault and the falsity of the statement.
At worst, the Hepps decision will preclude those private figure libel
plaintiffs with legitimate claims, who cannot meet the new burden placed
upon them, from filing libel suits. The decision changes nothing for those
responsible members of the media because they will be able to continue
pursuing their goals in disseminating vital information. It is those irrespon-
sible media publishers and reporters who have the most to gain from this
decision. These members of the media will be afforded the opportunity to
publish with impunity, secure in the knowledge that those with valid com-
plaints will hesitate to pursue litigation because they are unable to meet the
burden imposed on them in Hepps.
CONCLUSION
A rule which imposes such an onerous burden of proof on a private figure
plaintiff serves no purpose in furthering first amendment rights. As Justice
Stevens states in his dissent in Hepps: "The Court's decision trades on the
good names of private individuals with little First Amendment coin to show
137. 106 S. Ct. at 2928 (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also Dombey
v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.2d 562 (Ariz. 1986) (dealing with a limited public figure
who had to establish actual malice).1 The Dombey court stated, "Assuming this is bad jour-
nalism, it still would not establish reckless disregard of truth. Actual malice is subjective and
not based on journalistic standards or their breach." Id. at 575. The Dombey court held that
failure to investigate, sloppy investigation, poor reporting practices and the like are not per
se actual malice. Id. at 574. The court reached this conclusion after Dombey requested a retraction
(the first of which was published but contained further false statements about him) not once
but twice and included a three-inch-thick file detailing each error in the articles. Id. at 575.
The newspaper continued to publish articles, even after notice that the statements were false
and the supporting documents had been delivered to the editor. One wonders how much evidence
a libel plaintiff must produce before actual malice can be established per se.
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for it." '38 In a true marketplace of ideas, both sides must be heard, and the
burden imposed by the Court in Hepps is almost a guarantee that only those
with the resources to do so may voice their opinions.
The Court should not have placed the additional burden of proving falsity
on the private figure libel plaintiff. Libel plaintiffs want to clear their names
in the community in which they work and live."' In its effort to preserve
the freedom of the press, the Court has made it impossible for the libel
plaintiff to vindicate his reputation. 1
40
Evdoxia Beroukas
138. 106 S. Ct. at 1571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. See Soloski supra note 125. The vast majority of libel plaintiffs are upset with the alleged
falsity and most said that the publication caused them emotional, not financial harm. Half of
these plaintiffs go to the media and attempt to get a retraction printed before they see an
attorney about bringing suit. Id. at 219. See also Dun & Bradstreet: "[Slince libel plaintiffs
are very likely more interested in clearing their names than in damages, I doubt that limiting
recoveries would deter or be unfair to them." 472 U.S. at 774. Justice White reasoned that the
press would be no worse off if the common law rules applied and the judiciary insisted on
reasonable damages or the legislature placed a ceiling on such damages. Id. at 771.
I still believe that the common law rules should have been retained where plaintiff
is not a public official or public figure. As I see it, the Court undervalued the
reputational interest at stake in such cases. I ... doubt the easy assumption that
the common law rules would muzzle the press . . . . I cannot assume the press...
will be intimidated into withholding news that by decent journalistic standards it
believes to be true.
Id. at 772 (White, J., concurring).
140. See Daly, Ensuring Fair Trials and a Free Press: A Task for the Press and the Bar
Alike, 50 A.B.A. J. 1037 (Nov. 1964).
The problem is an everyday problem, has existed for a very long time. Our two
professions [press and bar] need to examine the record exhaustively, do some soul
searching, some house cleaning, and, then, consider if new rules and regulations
should be formulated and enforced. It may be there are already enough rules and
regulations, and all we need is some guts and vision.
Id. at 1042.

